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In recent years, the Federal Reserve has become more
explicit in stating a goalofgradually reducing inflation to
near zero rates. An important consideration in seeking
lower inflation is the transition cost (lost output and
employment) incurred in the process. In this paperwe ask
whether the output-inflation trade-off in the US. is any
more favorable now than it was in the high-inflation
environmentofthe latei970sandearlyi980s. Ourempiri-
cal estimates suggest that this trade-offis about the same
as it was in the earlierperiod. in lightofthese results, we
consider ways in which policies might be designed to
reduce the amount oflost output associated with further
disinflation.
Since late 1979, the Federal Reserve has pursued disinfla-
tionary monetary policies that can be characterized as
occurring in two stages. First, in 1979-1981 the Fed suc-
cessfully reduced inflation from double-digit to moderate
rates of around 3Y2 percent in 1983-1985. Beginning in
1988, the Fed began explicitly stating that it intended to
achieve a second period ofdisinflation, gradually moving
the inflation rate from a moderate level ofabout 4 percent
atthattimeto verylow levels ("near" pricestability)overa
number of years. In 1992, CPI inflation was 3 percent,
before dropping to about 212 percentin the first ten months
of1993, indicating modest progress toward this goal.
An importantconsideration in seeking lower inflation is
how to design policies that minimize the size of the
transition costs that will be incurred in the process. These
costs depend importantly on the credibility ofthe disinfla-
tion policy, i.e., on whether the public believes that the
central bank actually will adhere to that policy. Thus a
more (less) credible disinflation policy will translate more
(less) quickly into lower inflation expectations, and there-
fore will have smaller (larger) effects on economic output.l
The costs associated with the policy ofthe early 1980s
appeared to have been large, since the U.S. economy
experienced the deepestrecession ofthe post-World WarII
periodin those years. This is not surprising. Overthe prior
decade the inflation rate had reached serious proportions,
and thus the public may have needed to see some results
before it began to believe in the Fed's resolve.
In this paper, we ask whether the transition costs have
been any smaller in the recent disinflationary period than
they were during the episode of the early 1980s. If so, it
may be because the Fed's policies gained some credibility
from its earlier disinflationary success, which reduced the
1. For an extensive review of the literature on monetaty policy and
policy credibility, see Blackburn and Christensen (1989). In their
introduction, theynotethat", .. the argumentthatfigures prominently
in contemporaty discussions ofdeflationatymanagement-namelythat
greater credibility of an anti-inflationaty policy reduces the costs of
disinflation-ispersuasive" (p.2). Two approaches todesigning ananti-
inflation policy are discussed-gradualism, which implies a steady,
predictablereductionininflation, andirmnediacy, whichaims ata more
radical policy ofcutting inflation more quickly. In this paper, we focus
on the gradualist approach favored by the Fed.26 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
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1964 to lOY4 percent in late-1979, the dollar depreciated by
nearly 25 percent between 1970-1979, and the price of
gold rose to an historic high ofover $800 an ounce in 1979
before settling back to over $400.
In response to these problems, the Fed dropped its
practice oftargeting the federal funds rate and instituted a
new operating procedure under which it manipulated the
quantity of reserves supplied to banks in an attempt to hit
pre-announced ranges for several monetary aggregates.
The main aggregate used was the narrow measure, Ml,
which includes currency in the hands of the public and
fully checkable deposits. The new disinflationary policy
consisted ofattempting to achieve annual target ranges for
Ml, which would be gradually lowered over time.
Thepolicy was successfulin achieving itsmain goal: Be-
tween 1980and1983, CPIinflationfell from12.7to 3.1 per-
cent (annual averages over the prior year). The cost was the
mostsevererecessioninpost-WorldWarIIhistory, inwhich
the civilian unemployment rate peaked at 10.8 percent in
late-1982 and averaged over 9Y2 percent in both 1982 and
1983 (Figure 1).
By 1983 the operating procedures of monetary policy
had shifted. First, the Fed de-emphasized Ml in favor
size of the transition costs. Ifthe costs were not smaller,
then it may be because while the public believed that the
Fed would not let inflation get out ofcontrol as in the late
1970s, the public was not convinced that it would reduce
inflation from the moderate rates ofthe mid- to late-1980s
to near zero.
We address this empirical issue by estimating the size of
the short-run trade-off between output and inflation in the
U.S. Ourresults suggestthatthis trade-offis aboutthe same
now as it was in the early 1980s. In addition, we point out
thatsurveys oflong-terminflationexpectations suggestthat
the public expects inflation to rise abit from present levels
rather than decline according to the Fed's stated goal.
In light of these results, we consider ways in which
policies could be designed to enhance credibility and
thereby reduce the amount oflost output associated with a
given amount of disinflation. First, and foremost, cred-
ibility is established throughresults: i.e., actually reducing
the rate of inflation (Beebe 1991). However, it is possible
that within the context ofachieving a measure ofsuccess,
lost output could be limited during disinflation if the Fed
were more explicitaboutits disinflation goals. Thus having
an explicit year-by-year inflation goal or range might help.
Going a step further, we also discuss the potential en-
hancements to credibility offinding an intermediatepolicy
targetto supplant the monetary aggregates, which have be-
come less useful in recent years due to well-known insta-
bilities. Consistently employing an intermediate targetthat
is linked directly to the longer-term goal of reducing
inflation might contribute to an expeditious enhancement
ofthe credibility of that goal. Thus we suggest a class of
intermediate-targetingapproaches that mightproveuseful.
This paperfollows with four sections. SectionIis abrief
discussion of Fed disinflationary policy since 1979. Sec-
tion II provides evidence on the output-inflation trade-off.
SectionIIIprovides evidence on long-term inflationexpec-
tations. Section IV offers suggestions on how credibility
might be enhanced.
By the time Paul Volcker became Federal Reserve Chair-
man in mid-1979, the expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies ofthe late-1960s and 1970s had allowed consumer
inflation to rise well into double digits (see Figure 1). These
rates of inflation were very high by post-World War II
standards and disrupted U.S. and world financial markets.
U.S. long-term interest rates (for example, as measured by
20-year Treasury bond yields) rose from 414 percent in
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of a broader aggregate, M2. Problems with Ml appear
to have stemmedfrom bothfinancial innovation and dereg-
ulation. Such new instruments as repurchase agreements
and money market mutual funds were close substitutes for
the deposits in Ml, and therefore led to instability in its
velocity. The availability of these new instruments was a
major impetus behind the removal ofdeposit interest rate
ceilings, mainlyfrom 1978 to 1983. However, deregulation
also created problems by blurring the distinction between
transactions and savings balances held at depository in-
stitutions. The rationale for emphasizing M2 was that it
was broad enough to internalize much of the portfolio
substitution that had disrupted Ml.
Second, inday-to-day operations, theFedbegantofocus
on.the quantity ofreserves borrowed from Reserve Banks
as its operating instrument, which is similar to using the
federal funds rate as the instrument of policy (Wallich
1984). Moreover, the degree of precision in monetary
targeting was reduced, and money once again became one
among a numberofimportantindicators for policy, includ-
ingdataondevelopments intherealeconomy andprices, as
well as in the domestic and international financial markets
(Heller 1988).
The explicitness of a "price stability" goal did not
appear until late in the 1983-90 expansion. Early in the
expansion, official statements ofChairman Volcker gener-
ally were vague as to an inflation goal. For example, the
February6, 1984Monetary Reportto Congress statedthat,
"The (monetary) ranges for 1984 are intended to be
consistentwiththe basicobjectiveofachievinglong lasting
economic expansion in a context ofcontinuing control of
inflationary pressures."
However, afterbecoming Chairmanin1987, Mr. Green-
span stated explicitly in his monetary reports to Congress
that the Fed's long-term goal was price stability, although
neither a time frame nor specific annual goals for inflation
wereestablished. InhistestimonyofFebruary23, 1988, ac-
companying his first monetary report to Congress, Chair-
man Greenspan stated,"Progress toward price stability is
the foundation on which the longest peacetime expansion
inournation'shistory has beenbuilt, andcontinuedefforts
along this line will be the framework for future economic
advances." The February 20, 1990 Monetary Report to
Congress statedthat, "TheFederalOpenMarketCommit-
tee is committed to the achievement, over time, of price
stability." Moreover, Chairman Greenspan and a number
ofReserve BankPresidents supported a bill introduced by
Congressman·Neal requiring the Fed to achieve price sta-
bility within five years. Given the focus ofthe Greenspan
Fed on price stability, it may be instructive to think oftwo
disinflationary sub-periods since 1979: the early 1980s in
which inflation was reduced to around 3Y2 percent, and the
periodsincethe late-1980s inwhichafurtherreductionhas
been sought.
Overthe 1983-1990expansion, little orno progress was
madeinreducing inflationbelowthe4 percentratethathad
beenestablishedby1984. Infact, following temporarilylow
inflation in 1986, causedby a sharpdrop inthe oilprice, in-
flation began rising somewhat again, reaching over 5 per-
centon a consumerprice basis by 1990 (although the latter
rate was boosted by a temporary surge in the oil price.)
By mid-1989, the U.S. economy had slowed substan-
tially, growing at less than a 2 percentrate, until it fell into
recession inmid-1990. The recession, which was relatively
mild and lasted three quarters, was followed by a long
period of slow, but positive, growth in 1991 through mid-
1993. In response to the overall pattern ofslow economic
growthsince1989, inflationhas shownsignsofadownward
trend, averaging about 3 percent in 1992 and 2Y2 percent
over the first ten months of1993.
Since the onset ofthe 1990-1991 recession, Fed policy
has focused on boosting economic growth moderately,
although it has retained its long-run goal of gradually
reducing inflation to very low levels. M2 growth has
remained extremely weak. Especially in 1991 and 1992,
M2came in nearthe bottom of, orbelow, its annual range.
However, low M2 growth has not been considered a relia-
blemeasureofmonetarytightness, sinceM2's relationship
to othereconomic variables appears to have shifted signifi-
cantly. Like the earlierproblem withMl, the problem with
M2seems to have arisenprimarilyfrom financial deregula-
tion and innovation (Judd and Trehan 1992).
Forthese reasons, M2has been de-emphasizedinpolicy
decisions by the Fed in recent years. In essence, the Fed
has not had any monetary aggregate considered reliable
enough to use as a primary guide to monetary policy.
Instead, in recent years, it has relied on purely discretion-
ary adjustments tothe federal funds rate to find adelicately
balanced policy geared toward promoting moderate eco-
nomic growth, while making further progress in reducing
inflation.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON THE OUTPUT-INFLATION TRADE-OFF
In this section, we assess whether the output-inflation
trade-offhas shifted downward since the late 1970s, when
the Fed increased its emphasis in public statements and
actions on the goal of reducing inflation. To do so, we
analyze an equation commonly used to estimate the trade-
off, and we review movements in inflation expectations as
measured by surveys.28 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
To estimate the trade-off, we use:
(1) ~.pt = ex + x-aXt + f3aPt-I + "Y(Yt-I - Yt-I)
where, xt == Pt + Yt; X = log ofnominalGDP;p = log of
aggregate price level; Y = log ofreal GDP; andY= log
oftrend real GDP.
This equation has been used to estimate the trade-off
by authors with such diverse views about the structure
of the economy as Lucas (1973), Gordon (1983), Gordon
and King (1982), Schultze (1984), and Ball, Mankiw, and
Romer (1988).2 Thus equation (1) appears to be consis-
tent with both "new" and "old" Keynesian theory as well
as demand-oriented, or monetarist, equilibrium business
cycletheory. Correlationsofthetypeexpressedby theequa-
tion should be evident in both (1) an economy in which ex-
pectationsare adaptive, so that anexpectations-augmented
Phillips-curve would apply, and (2) an economy in which
expectations arerational, so thatthe "trade-off" represents
only an observed short-run correlation that is not exploita-
bleby policymakers. Thus Lucas (1973) derives arelation-
ship like equation (1) from a monetary-misperceptions
modelwithrational, optimizingagents, andGordon(1983)
shows how equation (1) can be viewed as a rearranged
version ofan adaptive-expectations Phillips curve.3
The key assumption underlying the equation is that
growth in nominal GDP is exogenous with respect to
inflation. As such, itwouldcapturetheeffectsofaggregate
demand on inflation, and would be independent ofaggre-
gate supply shocks. (The viability of this assumption is
assessedbelow.) Then, for a givenlaggedinflation rate and
state ofthe business cycle, the coefficient X- measures the
proportion ofthe change in aggregate demand that affects
prices in the short-run as opposed to output. The output-
inflation trade-offis calculated as 'T = (1- X-)/X-. Itmeas-
ures the percentage point change in output perpercentage
pointofchange in inflation resulting from a given change
in aggregate demand. Ifthe Fed's disinflation policy has
gained credibility over the.I980s, then X- should have risen
and'T should have declined over this period. Other coeffi-
2. Other papers dealing with this issue are Ball (1991,1993), Friedman
(1984, 1988), and Okun (1978).
3. In Judd and Beebe (1993, pp. 306 and 317), we tested for the stability
ofan inflation-augmented Phillips curve, which expressed wage infla-
tion as a function of slack in the labor market (as measured by the
unemployment rate relative to its estimated full employment level), and
expected wage inflation (as measured by past wage inflation). These
tests can be considered an alternative way oftesting for the stability of
the inflation-unemployment trade-off. Similar to the results discussed
below for equation 1, we failed to reject stability of the wage inflation
Phillips curve.
cients in the equation also might have changed. However,
following theearlierliterature, we willfocus exclusivelyon
X- and its implications for 'T.
Estimating the Trade-off
Table 1 presents the results ofestimating various forms of
equation (1) using annual data over 1949 to 1992. The
simplest estimated equation is shown in column 1. In this
column, the cyclical variable (y - Y)is formed by linearly
de-trending real GDP. (An alternative de-trending method
is discussed below.) All ofthe explanatory variables have
the expected signs, are highly significant, and together
account for about 82 percent of the variation in annual
inflation. This regression suggests that 'T averaged about
1.7 (.63/.37) in the U.S. in the post-WorldWarII period.4
However, in order to feel comfortable with the assump-
tion thatx is exogenous with respect to p, itis necessary to
investigate the issue of whether supply shocks are likely
to be biasing estimates of X-. A supply shock causesP and
Y to move in opposite directions. If these variables do
notmove by equal (proportional) amounts, then there will
be a resulting movement in nominal GDP, which will pro-
ducea correlation betweennominal GDPandinflation that
would be misinterpreted by the equation as reflecting the
trade-off. In otherwords, supply shocks willbias estimates
of X- unless the aggregate demandfunction has a (negative)
unitary elasticity.
Columns 2 through 6 represent attempts to see ifsupply
shocks present a problem in estimating X-. First, we intro-
duce supply shock variables to see if the estimate of X-
is altered substantially. Second, we use two-stage least
squares estimationto eliminate possible reverse causation,
andagainobserve whetherthis affects the estimateofX-. In
column 2, we add a dummy variable that attempts to
capture the effects of major oil shocks, by taking on the
valueof1in1974and1979and -1 in1986. Thisvariableis
significant in the equation and has the expected sign, but
does not significantly alter the estimate of X-. Column 3
shows two-stage-Ieast squares estimates ofthe same equa-
tion that was estimated with OLS in column 2. Again, the
estimate of X- is not materially affected. Column 4 intro-
duces changesintherelativepriceofoil (fromthe Producer
Price Index), and has no effect on X-. In column 5, we test
4. Using montecarlomethods, wecalculatedthe tstatistic for the testof
whetherthis estimateof'T isdifferentfrom zero, basedupon the estimate
ofAand its standarderrorin column 1. The tstatistic for'T was estimated
to be 4.33, suggesting that 'T is different from zero with a high level of
confidence.JUDD AND BEEBE/OUTPUT-INFLATION TRADE-OFF IN THE UNITED STATES 29
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NOTE: Marginal significance levels: *= .05; **= .01.
1. This equation was estimated with a two-stage least squares procedure. Instrumental variables used for .lx,include .lx,_j, .lb'_l' .lDEF,•
.lp,-l' y,_j, T" DO.
2. This equation was estimated with a two-stage least squares procedure. Instrumental variables used for .lx,and .lforex, include .lx,_j, .lbt _ j,
.lDEF,• .lp,_j, y,_j, T,. DO and .lforex,_j'
3. ywas estimated as the permanent component ofY from a VAR for Y and the six-month commercial paper rate as in ludd-Trehan (1990).
Because of well-known problems associated with using generated regressors (Pagan 1984), the t statistic on y,_j in column 6 is biased upward.
Definition of variables:
x = log ofnominal GDP == p +Y
P = log ofGDP deflator
Y = log ofreal GDP
y = log oftrend real GDP
T = time
poil = log ofrelative price of energy, producer price index
forex = real trade-weighted exchange rate beginning in 1969, zero from 1949 to 1968
!
1in 1974, 1979
DO = - 1 in 1986
oelsewhere
b = log of monetary base (FRB St. Louis)
DEF = log ofnominal federal defense expenditures30 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
for possible effects of changes in the real trade-weighted
value ofthedollar. Using two-stage-Ieast squares methods,
we again find no significant effect on the estimated size of
'A. We conclude from theseexercises thatthe basicequation
does not appear to be distorted by the effects of supply
shocks.
Asecond issue in estimating Ahas to do with how to de-
trend real GDP to form the business cycle variable (see
Rudebusch 1993). In the estimated equations discussed
above, we used alineartime trend to represent equilibrium
real GDP. In a second somewhat more complex approach,
weusedthemethodofBlanchard-Quah(1989) toextractthe
trend component. This method involves estimating astruc-
tural VAR with the identifying restriction that there are two
types ofshocks-apermanent and atransitory shock. 5The
permanentshockis associatedwithtrendreal output, while
the transitory shock is associated with the business cycle.
Thus, we introduced the transitory componentofreal GDP,
as estimated by this method, into the equation in column 6
in place ofYt-l and T in column 1. Based upon the esti-
mates of 'A incolumns 1and 6, this substitutionreducedthe
estimateohby 19 percent «1.70 - 1.38)/1.70). In the dis-
cussion below, we test for possible shifts in Ausing both
methods ofde-trending y, to be sure that this factor does not
affect our results.
Tests for Shifts in the Trade-off
In Table 2, we present tests for shifts in 'A. First, we take
columns 2and 6inTable 1andintroduce adummy variable
times the growth in nominal GDP, which yields columns 7
and9. These lattercolumns provide atestfor adecline in A
over 1980-1992 compared with 1949-1979. Column 7
(like column 2) uses linearly de-trended real GDP while
column9(like column 6) uses the Blanchard-Quahmethod
of de-trending. In both equations, the estimated A rises
somewhat (from .36 in 2to .42 in 7and from .42 in 6to .46
in 9), but neither change is statistically significant even at
the 10 percent level.
Using montecarlomethods, we calculatedthe tstatistics
for achange in 'T in1980-1992 based upon the estimates of
'A and their standard errors in columns 7 and 9. The results
were the same qualitatively as those for A: We were not able
to reject stability even at the 10 percent level.
5. Following Judd-Trehan (1990), we estimated a two-variable VAR for
log changes in real GDP and the change in the commercial paper rate,
using six lags ofeach variable. This system yielded impulse response
functions similar to those commonly found in the literature. Thus, for
example, positive transitory (demand) shocks cause output to rise
temporarily before returning to trend, while positive permanent (sup-
ply) shocks cause output to rise permanently.
One potential problem with the tests in columns 7 and 9
is that the period from 1949 to 1979 encompasses years
in which inflation was low (1949-1965), as well as years in
which inflation increased (1965-1979). The tests in col-
umn 7 and 9 ask whether 'A was different in 1980-1992
from the average ratio in the entire prior period, whereas
we are more interested in seeing if it rose in 1980-1992
compared with the period in which inflation rose (1965-
1979). Columns 8 and 10 attempt to address this question
by including slope dummy variables (on ~x) for 1965-1992
and for 1980-1992. Although column 8 shows a decrease
in 'A beginning in 1965, neithercolumn 8nor 10 suggests a
significant shift since the late 1970s.6
As a final check, we consider the possibility that Amay
have changed gradually following the late 1970s as the
public learned of the Fed's increased resolve to reduce
inflation. In Table 3 (p. 32) we test for ashiftin Ain blocks
stretching from each year in 1980-1992 to the end of the
sample. Again, we do not find any single dividing point in
which there is asignificant change in 'A, even at the 10 per-
cent level of significance.
In summary, despite aconsiderable search for ashiftin 'A
after the late 1970s, we have found none. It appears that the
Fed faces about the same output-inflationtrade-offtoday in
attempting to reduce inflation from its present moderate
level that it faced at the height ofthe inflation and financial
instability in 1979.
m. INFLATION EXPECTATIONS
Our conclusion that the output-inflation trade-off has not
shifted seems consistent with the evidence from surveys of
inflation expectations, which have been slow to adjust to
disinflationary results. As shown inFigure 2(p. 32), expec-
tations in 1980 through 1982 of average inflation over the
next ten years were well above subsequent actual ten-year
average inflation rates for the ten-year-ahead period. Even
by 1982, average inflation expected over the next 10 years
was 6% percent, while the ex postrealized average turned
out to be only 4 percent.
A decade later, long-run inflation expectations remain
well above the 1992 inflation rate of around 3 per-
cent. Financial decisionmakers, as represented by the
6. Ball, Mankiw, andRomer (1988) argue that the sacrifice ratio should
rise (fall) as inflation falls (rises) because of menu costs, and they
present cross-sectional evidence from a number of different countries
that such a relationship exits. However, using time-series data, Ball
(1993) fails to find this effect. We tested for this effectby indudingboth
Llx and Llx2 in regressions 7 and 9, Table 2. The combination ofthese
two variables means thatthesacrificeratiocanvary withthe growthrate
ofnominal demand. Like Ball, we failed to find a significant effectin
our time-series data.JUDD AND BEEBE/OUTPUT-INFLATION TRADE-OFF IN THE UNITED STATES 31
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NOTE: Marginal significance levels: *= .05; **=.01.
Definition ofvariables:
D65 = { 11965-1992
. 0 elsewhere
D80 = { 11980-1992
oelsewhere
Other variables are defined in Table 1.
Hoey/Philadelphia Fed survey, expect inflation to average
3% percent over the next ten years (survey of 1993.Q2),
whilethe Michigansurvey suggests thathouseholds expect
a 5Y4 percent average inflation rate over the same period
(average ofJanuary through May 1993 surveys). Itappears
that the public remains unconvinced that the Fed will
achieve inflation much below 4 percent, despite the stated
goal ofprice stability.
IV: WHAT CAN BE DONE
TO MAKE DISINFLATION LESS COSTLY?
Apparently, the Fed faces the same output-inflation trade-
offnow that itfaced in the early 1980s as it sought to bring
inflation down from double-digit rates. Of course, one
reasonfor this maybethatithas yetto produceclearresults
in reducing inflation significantly below the level estab-
lished in the mid-1980s. Although it seems unlikely that
the public fears another outbreak ofdouble-digit inflation,
evidence has not yet· been observed supporting the view
that inflation will move to a level much below those that
have prevailed since the mid-1980s.
Doubts about lower inflation may be magnified by large
actual andprojected federal budget deficits since the early
1980s. There may be concern that in the long run, per-
sistently large deficits will lead to higher inflation, even
though the Fed generally is credited with not having
succumbedto pressure to monetizethefederal debttodate.
In addition, the current design ofmonetary policy may
not make it easy for the public to discern how much
emphasis is being placed on inflation reduction. Although
the Fed has stated for. a number of years that its main
objective is to eliminateinflation, italso has paidattention
to output stabilization. The expressed intent ofmitigating32 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
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cyclical downturns inevitably raises the issue of whether
this goal will take precedence over disinflation at any
particulartime. Given the discretionary approach followed
by the Fed, in which it resolves conflicts between the two
goals on a case-by-case basis, it may be difficult for the
public to be sure that the Fed's resolve to reduce inflation
has not flagged.
Oneapproachthatmighthelpconvincethepublicthatthe
Fed is serious about disinflation would be to announce
specific inflation targets, or at least target ranges, for the
yearsahead.7Byshowingawillingnesstocommititselfto a
particularpathofdisinflation, andthereafter, toaparticular
range for inflation, the Fed might be making its resolve
more credible. Moreover, it would be providing the market
withabenchmarkforjudgingprogressinmeetingthatgoal.
A related issue concerns intermediate targets for mone-
tary policy. As discussed above, although the Fed estab-
lishes target ranges for the monetary aggregates, it often
does not take actions to achieve those targets, since rapid
financial change has made itinadvisable to adhere to rigid
targets for these variables. As a consequence, however; the
market has received ambiguous and confusing signals
about what the Fedis doing to achieve its long-run disinfla-
tion goal. Ifthe Fed had been able to pursue its monetary
target variables more aggressively, it might have enhanced
the credibility ofits disinflation goal by providing the mar-
ket with timely feedback on whether it was acting in the
short run in a way that would achieve its long-run inflation
goal (Cukierman-Meltzer 1986).
Given the problems with the monetary aggregates, it
seems worthwhile to evaluate the usefulness ofalternative
intermediate target variables and targeting procedures.
Recent research outlined briefly in the accompanying box
suggests that nominal GDP possibly could be used ef-
fectively as an intermediatetargetin acontextin which the
Fed retains its use of a nominal interest rate as its instru-
mentofpolicy (Judd andMotley 1992 andelsewhere in this
Review). Essentially, the approach involves raising (lower-
ing) a short-termnominal interest rate whenevergrowth in
last period's nominal GDP exceeds (falls short of) a pre-
established target for nominal GDP growth. The targeted
growth rate for nominal GDP would be chosen to be con-
sistent with a goal for inflation and made explicit ex ante.
A monetary policy rule such as this offers several
potential advantages. First, nominal GDP would not be
disrupted by shifts in the velocity of money. Second, to
construct such a rule, the FederalReserve would first have
to specify an inflation goal. Moreover, by linking specific 83 85 87 89 91 93 77 79 81
PERIOD TESTED (8) (10)
1980-92 .076 (0.25) .022 (0.68)
-tn01 n .... .021 (0.76) - .006 (0.91) l~Ol-~~
1982-92 - .121 (0.18) - .049 (0.47)
1983-92 - .117 (0.20) - .048 (0.47)
1984-92 - .071 (0.43) - .041 (0.55)
1985-92 - .101 (0.34) - .043 (0.59)
1986-92 - .038 (0.73) - .017 (0.84)
1987-92 - .048 (0.64) - .002 (0.98)
1988-92 - .022 (0.84) - .025 (0.80)
1989-92 .006 (0.96) - .024 (0.84)
1990-92 .019 (0.91) .009 (0.96)
1991-92 .052 (0.81) .011 (0.96)







EXPECTEDAND ACTUAL CPI INFLATION
FOR TEN YEARS AHEAD
TESTING FOR CHANGES IN THE OUTPUT-INFLATION
TRADE-OFF IN 1980 THROUGH 1992
TABLE 3
NOTE: Marginal significance levels shown in parentheses. For exam-
ple, a marginal significance level of 0.10 would suggest that stability
could be rejected with the probability of 10 percent that the equation
is stable. Tne power of these tests declines as the dividing point in the
sample moves toward the end ofthe sample.
Shaded areas represent recessions as defined by the NBER.
Expected and actual data are for averages over the next 10 years, not
for the 10th year out.
7. Inthis discussion, weconfineourselves towaysofimprovingthecred-
ibilityofgradualistdisinflation policies. Foradiscussionofthe merits of
"cold-turkey" approaches, see Ball (1993) and Sargent (1983).JUDD AND BEEBE/OUTPUT-INFLATION TRADE-OFF IN THEUNlTED STATES 33
LINKING AN INFLATION GOAL
TO AN INTERMEDIATE TARGET AND
OPERATING PROCEDURE
The following rule is used to illustrate an approach to
policy that might have advantages from the point of
view of expeditiously establishing credibility. The
feedback rule links movements in a short-tew1 inter-
estrate to nominal GDP:
ARt = 8[Axt_1 -: AX;_d·
The variable R denotes the policy instrument,
which in this case is a short-term nominal interest
rate such as the federal funds rate that is under the
direct short-run control of the monetary authority.
The variable x represents the intermediate target
variable of policy, which in this case is (the log of)
nominal GDP. The rule specifies that the change in
the interest rate each quarter is a function of last
quarter's deviation between the growth rate ofnomi-
nal GDP (Ax) and its target growth rate (Ax*).
The targeted growth rate of nominal GDP would
be set according to:
Ax; = Ap; + AYt,
where Ap* is the central bank's inflation target and
Ay is the estimatedtrend growth rate of real GDP.
The strength ofthe monetary authority's response to
deviations between Ax and Ax* is defined by 8, and
can be selected by the central baIlk. Based upon
stochastic simulations of two small macroeconomic
models, this rule appears to be capable of holding
long-run inflation to within fairly narrow bounds,
without substantially increasing volatilities in real
GDP or interest rates above those observed in the
post-war period (Judd-Motley 1992 and this issue.)
policy actions (i.e., changes inashort-terminterestrate) to
an intermediate target that is simply and clearly linked
to the inflation goal, the public would have asimple way to
monitor the Fed's resolve to achieve and maintain that
inflation goal. Finally, the rule either could be followed
explicitly by the Fed or be used to guide and assess a
discretionary policy, should the Fed wish to diverge from
the policy prescribed by the rule. While a full assessment
of such an approach would involve issues other than
credibility, itappears that anapproach ofthis type, whether
used as a rule or as abaseline for discretion, might reduce
the cost ofdisinflation.
In conclusion, the empirical tests in this paper suggest
strongly that the output cost of reducing inflation is about
the same as it was at the height ofthe inflationary period
from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. It is possible,
however, that this cost might be reduced ifthe Fed were to
make a public commitment to an explicit inflation target
and perhaps ifitalso were to commit itselfto an intermedi-
ate target and operating procedure linked explicitly to the
inflation target.34 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
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